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PREFERENTIAL 'IRADE AGREEMENTS:
THE WRONG ROAD
jAGDISH BHAGWATI*

At the Conservative Party annual meeting in Blackpool in 1995,
British Prime Minister John Major invoked George Orwell in his
radical youth, when he went by his given name of Eric Blair, to tweak
Labour Party leader Tony Blair as having changed everything except
his name. I would like to invoke the later George Orwell and begin by
suggesting that the widespread usage of the term "free trade agreements" (FTAs) to describe what are really preferential trade agreements (PTAs) is nothing but Orwellian Newspeak.
For FTAs are not the same as free trade, even though that is what most
politicians andjournalists believe. I sometimes amuse my audience by
saying that politicians, fed on soundbites, cannot comprehend more
than two words at one time and are therefore prone to equate "free
trade areas" with "free trade." In fact, the great international economist Jacob Viner, the founding father of the theory of preferential
trading arrangements introduced in his celebrated 1950 book, The
Customs Union Issue, attributed the support the free traders of his time
had for discriminatory freeing of trade to "an unreflecting association
on their part of any removal or reduction in trade barriers with
movement in the direction of free trade." 1
The nature of FTAs is to offer free trade only to members, not to
non-members. Thus, FfAs are two-faced: they ensure free trade for
members and (relative) protection against non-members. First-year
students of international economics would be asked to shift to a
different field if they could not grasp this elementary and elemental
distinction, and yet today's politicians imagine themselves to be states* Arthur Lehman Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science, Columbia
University. This text amplifies remarks made at a summer 1995 meeting in Stockholm on issues
before the World Trade Organization (WfO), organized by Swedish Minister Mats Hellstrom. I
am thankful to Magnus Blomstrorll, Pravin Krishna, Arvind Panagariya, T.N. Srinivasan, and Alan
Winters for helpful conversations. Some of the key arguments in the text have been developed in
depth in two recent papers: a policy paper,Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with
Free Trade Areas, in jAGDISH BHAGWATI & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 ( 1995), and a theoretical analysis, Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya,
Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?, in THE ECONOMICS OF
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS Qagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1996).
1. See Arvind Panagariya, Folly of Thinking All Trade Liberalization Can Be Good, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1996, at 16 (letter to the editor).
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men endorsing free trade when they embrace these inherently discriminatory PTAs.
As PTAs proliferate, the main problem that arises is the accompanying proliferation of discrimination in market access and a whole maze
of trade duties and barriers that vary among PTA.$. I have called this
outcome the "spaghetti bowl" phenomenon.2 (I must confess that I
once used this analogy in an after-dinner speech when the chairman
was an Italian who did not quite share my difficulty in handling
spaghetti and seemed genuinely puzzled!) Mr. David de Pury, a distinguished representative of the globalized private sector and the chief
executive officer of ABB, Switzerland, is among the renowned executives who have expressed themselves in public fora precisely on this
point and on the advantage, even the necessity, of having uniform
nondiscriminatory rules and barriers. 3 I endorse this objective, which
only multilateral WTO-sanctioned treaties make possible. In view of its
importance, let me say a little more on this question.
I.

THE SPAGHETTI BOWL: PROBLEMS WITH PREFERENTIAL TRADING
.ARRANGEMENTS

The spaghetti bowl proliferation of preferential trading arrangemen ts clutters up trade with discriminatory focus on the "nationality"
of goods, creating the inevitable costs that trade experts have long
noted. In particular, consider the following points, some of which are
relevant only for FTAs, others of which are more generally relevant.
Rules of origin, which are inherently arbitrary despite the extensive
codifications that accompany them, multiply under FfAs because
different members have different external tariffs. This makes the role
of the lobbyist (who protects clients by fiddling first with the adoption
of rules of origin and then with the estimates that underlie the
application of these rules) and the customs officer (who can make
money by assigning goods the origin suggested by those bearing gifts)
immensely profitable at our expense.
More generally, it is increasingly arbitrary to operate a trade policy
on the assumption that one can identify which product comes from
which c;ountry. When I was a student at Oxford in the 1950s, there used
to be a "Who's Whose" that listed the bondings (or "steady relation2. See Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas, in jAGDISH
BHAGWATI & ANNE 0. KRUEGER, THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1
(1995).
3. He spoke eloquently, in fact, on this theme at the Stockholm trade meeting mentioned
supra.
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ships," in our slang) among the undergraduates. Needless to say, the
sexual revolution and the rise of uninhibited promiscuity put an end to
that list. Similarly, the phenomenal globalization of investment and
production makes a Who's Whose listing of which products come from
which country more and more of an anomaly, tying up trade policy in
knots and absurdities and facilitating protectionist capture of rules of
origin.
Let's take some telling examples. In the United States, we have tried
assiduously to tell the Japanese that exports to Japan from their
transplants in the United States cannot be counted as U.S. exports. On
the other hand, when the Europeans tried to include cars imported
from these U.S.-based Japanese transplants in their VER quotas for
Japanese cars, Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative at the time, was up
in arms. Because European trade policy seeks to control imports from
Japan rather than imports from all sources (as would be the case with a
tariff or an auctioned VER), the European Union (EU) is in knots
about whether Japanese transplants in the United Kingdom should be
allowed freedom of access within the EU, and whether a car produced
in Oxfordshire is British or Japanese.
As the globalization of the world economy increasingly muddies the
idealized picture of distinctly Japanese, American, British, Indian, and
Mexican goods that drives much of trade policy (particularly the
pursuit ofFTAs), we trade economists can see more clearly the wisdom
of the great trade theorists of the past, who were strongly wedded to
nondiscrimination and hence to most-favored-nation (MFN) and multilateralism. As usual, a quote from Keynes says it best. In 1945, after
having renounced his earlier skepticism about nondiscrimination during the Britain-U.S. discussions of the design of the postwar Bretton
Woods institutions, Keynes spoke before the House of Lords:
[The proposed policies] aim, above all, at the restoration of
multilateral trade ... [T]he bias of the policies before you is
against bilateral barter and every kind of discriminatory practice. The separate blocs and all the friction and loss of friendship they must bring with them are expedients to which one
may be driven in a hostile world where trade has ceased over
wide areas to be cooperative and peaceful and where are
forgotten the healthy rules of mutual advantage and equal
treatment. But it is surely crazy to prefer that. 4

4. SeeJAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 64 (1991) (emphasis added).
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So, the question comes before us: Why are we crazy enough to go
down the PTA route, as both EU and U.S. policy-makers are so keen to
do? 5 Before I turn to that, I first want to make an important distinction.

II.

Two 'IYPES OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS

I believe we should make a distinction between two different types of
PTAs. First, there are PTAs among non-hegemonic countries (chiefly
the developing countries), such as MERCOSUR, which contains Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Second, there are PTAs that include hegemonic countries of the Triad, such as NAFTA and its proposed extensions, the proposed transformation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) into a PTA, the proposed Trans-Atlantic Free Trade
Agreement (TAFTA) (which would have a mix of hegemonic and
non-hegemonic members), the EU, and the EU's association agreements with other countries.
I would say that the non-hegemonic ( or, broadly speaking, developing country) PTAs are not of great concern. For one thing, they do not
have much impact: what MERCOSUR or ASEAN does is of little
consequence outside of itself, certainly compared to the impact of the
big-ticket hegemonic PTAs. But the main reason for going along with
non-hegemonic PTAs, despite the accompanying costs, is simply that in
comparison to the protectionist policies of many developing countries,
any freeing of trade is a desirable change. Furthermore, in light of the
undisciplined, freewheeling, chaotic set of preferences these countries
granted each other under the Economic Cooperation Among Developing Countries regime, their acceptance of Article XXIV discipline can
only be seen as a progressive measure, despite the fact that the better
and ideal thing would be for them to lower trade barriers in a
nondiscriminatory fashion instead.
These arguments for tolerating preferential agreements do not

5. Arvind Panagariya's letter to the Financial Times, supra note 1, was prompted by U.S.
Ambassador Stuart Eisenstat's denunciation of the EU for its partiality towards PTAs. These
remarks inspired an EU spokesman to retort that "the pot was calling the kettle black," and
Eisenstat retreated, claiming that he was against "partial" PTAs that exempt some sectors, but not
against the "full" PTA that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) claims to be.
Aside from the fact that NAFTA has its own holes, including recent backtracking on Mexican
trucks' access to U.S. roads, Ambassador Eisenstat has nothing but assertion on his side when he
claims that full preferences are better than partial preferences. Indeed, some economic arguments suggest the opposite. But then, the distinguished Ambassador cannot be expected to be
familiar with these issues, and, in any event, he must take his instructions from Washington.
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apply, however, to PTAs that have hegemonic powers within their
membership. The course of action taken by hegemonic PTAs certainly
affects the system, and, unlike developing countries, hegemonic powers (especially the United States) have previously been wedded to
multilateralism, so when they move to preferential agreements they are
moving from an optimal to a suboptimal approach. For these PTAs,
therefore, we must impose more drastic standards for approval.

Ill.

Two

CRITERIA FOR APPROVING

PTAs

What criteria should we impose for approving hegemonic PTAs? In
essence, I would make an exception and permit such PTAs in two cases.
First, I would permit a PTA that is building a common market with full
factor mobility, a common external tariff, and even political integration. This is, of course, the core of the EU, and it offers the advantages
that the United States already enjoys as a federal country with deep
integration among its states. Second, I would permit a PTA where it
represents the only way to achieve multilateral free trade among
nations because the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) process
made available by the CATT /WTO is stalled. This is the option that the
United States chose after finding the EC in a denial mode at the
November 1982 CATT Ministerial, when the demand was made for a
new MTN round. When the United States started negotiating the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1983, it was choosing an inferior
(PTA) option only because the preferred (MTN) option was not
available. The apt analogy might be that the United States took the dirt
road because it could not take the turnpike.
Unfortunately, the United States has since abandoned this' rationale
for choosing the PTA route. Despite the fact that the Uruguay Round
was in fact launched and successfully concluded and has led to a
functioning WTO, and the world's attention is focused on determining
what the WTO's next agenda should be, the United States remains
poised to continue· its pursuit of PTAs through NAFTA expansion and
possibly through the eventual transformation of APEC into a PTA. In
short, the United States is now committed to "walking on two legs":
MTN and PTAs. My fear is that the United States is destined to get itself,
and through unwitting example the rest of the world as well, to walk on
all fours. As Under Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers, a
noted public finance economist, once wrote, "[e]conomists should
maintain a strong, but rebuttable, presumption in favor of all lateral
reductions in trade barriers, whether they be multi-, uni- , tri-, or
1996)
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plurilateral." 6 Summers and others share the presumption that PTAs
will exercise a benign, beneficial effect on the course of multilateral
trade negotiations.
My own view is that this presumption is unpersuasive, and that the
effect of the PTA path on the MTN path has been malign, not benign. I
have already written on this issue at length in different places, so I will
not repeat myself here, and instead I urge the audience to read the
arguments in the original. 7 I will, however, mention two of the many
arguments to give you a flavor of the debate.
First, one proponent of the PTA approach, Fred Bergsten of the
Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C., has argued
recently that the Uruguay Round was closed successfully because the
Seattle APEC meeting served notice to the Europeans that the United
States was ready and willing to go the alternative preferential route,
which would cut the Europeans out. I consider this quite fanciful
indeed. The notion that the Europeans would believe that the Asian
members of APEC would play for the United States in competition
against the EU, when they are in both markets in a big way and when
Asia has for nearly two centuries been within Europe's sphere of
influence and interest, is a little hard to swallow. Besides, it is clear that
in the end the Uruguay Round was settled almost entirely (I would say
over 90%) along the lines of the Dunkel draft, because the U.S.
administration decided to accept the advice of many, including myself:
settle the Round for what you can get (from the French primarily) and
go on to build on that result in the next set(s) of negotiations. But the
desire to inflate the claims on behalf of PTAs is so strong on the
Washington scene, especially now that the Clinton administration has
firmly put itself on that side of the street, that it is hardly surprising to
find that many who live close to that scene fall prey to it.
As for the malign impact of PTAs, it is not difficult to find examples.
The effect of the NAFTA debate was to make the issue of what effect
trade with poorer countries would have on jobs and wages in richer
countries politically salient in the United States. The fact that Mexico
was a source of millions of illiterate, ill-nourished, and impoverished
illegal immigrants was enough to make many in the United States feel

6. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateralism:
Strangers, Friends or Foes?, in THE ECONOMICS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS Oagdish Bhagwati
& Arvind Panagariya eds., 1996).
7. Seejagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22 Qaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993); Bhagwati & Panagariya, supra note 6.
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that free trade with Mexico would lead indirectly to Mexico's masses
having an adverse effect on jobs and wages as well. By contrast, the
Uruguay Round did not stir up this issue, even though India and China
have many more millions of poor in their midst, simply because those
countries were too far away and the Uruguay Round was diffused over
many issues and many countries. In fact, I would argue that ifliberalization of trade with Mexico had been done under GATT auspices along
with all the other countries of the GAIT, it would not have unleashed
the same worries that we are now burdened with and that Pat Buchanan
exploited so much. Thus, the legacy of NAFfA (a PTA) is that all future
liberalizations with poor countries will be much more difficult than
they would have been if there had been no NAFfA.
IV.

CAVEATS ON

NAFfA, APEC,

AND

TAFfA

Let me conclude by arguing against the extension ofNAFfA to Chile
and other countries, and in favor of intensifying NAFTA into a common market for North America itself, something along the lines of the
EC. Turning APEC into an FfA is an equally bad idea. Fortunately, the
Asian members of APEC have shown little enthusiasm for such a
prescription, opting instead for liberalization on an MFN basis, despite
U.S. pressure to choose the FfA model and ambiguities in some of the
pronouncements on the subject. 8
As for TAFfA, I am happy to see that current WTO Director-General
Renato Ruggiero, former WTO Director-General Peter Sutherland,
and EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan have been widely
reported to be insisting that TAFfA be on an MFN basis; this, of course,
is another way of saying that TAFfA should not really be an Article
XXIV type of PTA. (A recent meeting in Madrid on the subject of
U.S.-EC trade and investment cooperation did not endorse TAFfA in
the form ofa PTA.)
I would hope, therefore, that these sorts of very welcome initiatives
continue to be prevented from being turned into PTAs. In fact, true
statesmanship requires that, in full recognition of the advantages of
nondiscriminatory multilateralism, these initiatives be folded instead
into the next MTN, the first WTO Round, whose method oflaunching
should be the first order of business in Singapore at the first WTO
Ministerial in December 1996.

8. The APEC Osaka Summit, held after the Stockholm meeting discussed supra, did not
announce anything other than MFN trade liberalization measures.
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